This paper analyzes the impact of competition among downstream firms on an upstream firm's payoff and on its incentive to vertically integrate when firms on both segments negotiate optimal contracts. We argue that tougher competition decreases the downstream industry profit, but improves the upstream firm's negotiation position. In particular, the upstream firm is better off encouraging competition when the downstream firms have high bargaining power. We derive implications on the interplay between vertical integration and competition among the downstream firms. The mere possibility of vertical integration may constitute a barrier to entry and may trigger strategic horizontal spin-offs or mergers. We analyze the impact of upstream competition on our results.
Introduction
This paper analyzes a monopolistic upstream firm's incentive to promote competition between downstream firms and to vertically integrate one downstream firm. The downstream firms compete both to buy input from the upstream firm and to sell output to consumers. For each transaction, optimal tariffs contingent on the quantity exchanged are considered so that double marginalization is irrelevant. Hence, fiercer competition among downstream firms has two opposite effects on the payoff to the upstream firm: it erodes the downstream industry profit, but it improves the upstream firm's negotiation position, i.e.
it gets a larger share of a lower industry profit. In a world of incomplete contracts, ceteris paribus, the upstream firm's surplus increases with both the industry surplus and the share of the industry surplus it captures. As a result, more downstream competition increases (resp. decreases) the payoff to the upstream firm when the upstream firm has low (resp. high) bargaining power. Building on these results, we analyze the case where the upstream firm vertically integrates one downstream firm. Since this affects the total quantity supplied and the number of active downstream firms, the incentive to vertically integrate depends on the market environment. We further analyze the impact of upstream competition on these results.
Consider an industry where a monopolistic upstream firm sells an input to downstream firms competing both for the input and on the output market.
We assume that contracts are incomplete in the sense that the trade contract between the upstream firm and each downstream firm is not observable to the other parties and cannot be made contingent on outputs. Hence, competition as measured by the number of downstream firms has two effects: on the one hand, the transfer is contingent on the total industry profit which is reduced by more competition in the output market, i.e. there is a rent reduction effect 1 .
On the other hand, fiercer competition between downstream firms improves the negotiation position of the upstream firm. It leads the downstream firms to make higher bids for the upstream firm's input. This negotiation effect alone makes competition desirable to the upstream firm as it receives a larger share of the surplus 2 . Thus, competition has an ambiguous effect on the payoff to the upstream firm. In particular, in situations where the upstream firm has low bargaining power, it is better off with a more competitive downstream industry.
We then investigate the interaction between the competitive environment and the incentive to vertically integrate: since the firms have no alternative source of supply, vertical integration leads to total foreclosure and monopolization of the downstream market. The reason is that the upstream firm knows about its transactions about other downstream firms and it internalizes the negative externality to its subsidiary if it supplies them. Thus, the payoff to the upstream firm under integration does not depend on the number of downstream firms while the upstream firm's payoff under non-integration is subject to the effects explained above. When the rent reduction (resp. negotiation) effect dominates, vertical integration is most valuable when there is a high (resp. low) level of competition.
Suppose that downstream firms may initially enter the market at a cost and that vertical integration makes this integrated firm bear some agency (Crémer (1994) ), legal or informational cost. The mere possibility of vertical integration may act as a barrier to entry: potential entrants into the downstream market can be deterred if they anticipate that their entry would trigger vertical integration which would in turn imply market foreclosure. When there is no entry, prospect of deregulation eventually leading to some competition between national telecom companies is widely believed to constitute a pressure on upstream firms as well. 2 Rajan (1992) develops a theory of arm's-length debt somewhat related to our negotiation effect where arm's-length debt reduces the creditors' bargaining power. However, in his paper, the lower bargaining position of creditors is due to their inability to acquire information about the borrower rather than competition.
but when the downstream firms may separate or merge, horizontal mergers or spin-offs may take place in order to prevent vertical integration. From the upstream firm's viewpoint, the mere threat of vertical integration may act as a disciplinary device for downstream firms.
The present paper is closely related to the literature on vertical relationships and market foreclosure in which an upstream firm can appropriate (some of) the downstream industry profit via exclusivity contracts, (price) discrimination and/or vertical integration (see Rey and Tirole's (1997) survey, hereafter RT).
In this literature, the upstream firm can appropriate the downstream industry profit thanks to vertical restraints. It is thus better off reducing competition in the downstream industry. While this argument also appears in this paper, we further argue that downstream competition may be desirable to the upstream firm as it enables it to increase its share of the downstream industry profit. Papers particularly close in spirit to ours are Whinston (1991, 1993 ) (hereafter BW) and especially Hart and Tirole (1990) (hereafter HT) who consider a framework where one or two upstream firms supply two downstream firms competing both for input and in the output market 3 . They analyze conditions favoring vertical integration, when vertical integration leads to market foreclosure and when it is socially desirable. These papers, however, find that firms have an incentive to restrict competition in the vertically related market and that they have too high an incentive for vertical integration.
In this paper, we point out that their results depend on specific assumptions about their bargaining game or the upstream firms' cost structure.
Although it has often been overlooked in IO theory, the analysis of private and public incentives to promote competition in vertically related markets is of practical importance for both firms and regulators. For instance, following a change in the regulatory environment, AT&T has recently decided to divest its supplier AT&T Technology so as to promote competition among downstream 3 The reader can also refer to McLaren (1997) for an analysis of the asset specificity problem in vertically related markets. firms (RT). Under integration, AT&T Technology could not have committed not to discriminate against AT&T's rivals. The rivals would then have turned to alternative suppliers. The short-term gains from monopolization would have been more than offset by the long-term costs of the subsequent new relationships and competition. In this paper, increasing downstream competition aims at improving the negotiation position, but it may take place because of a supply assurance motive as well 4 . A good understanding of how these incentives depend on technology, demand or the competitive environment may guide contract design and decisions about vertical integration and spin-offs as well as competition policy.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 describes the negotiation and rent reduction effects and derives costs and benefits of competition. The interplay between vertical integration and competition between downstream firms is examined in section 4. Section 5 examines the impact of upstream competition on these results and Section 6 concludes.
The Model
An upstream firm U produces an input that it can sell to n ≤ N potential downstream firms D 1 , ..., D n competing in an output market. The inverse demand function in the output Q → P (Q) is assumed decreasing and concave:
P < 0 and P < 0. The downstream firms need one unit of the input to produce one unit of the homogeneous output. Downstream firm D i has a zero transformation cost and has no alternative supply source.
To produce a good for downstream firm D i , the upstream firm needs to bear the cost f (i) of opening a specific line of production. For instance, this line of production can be thought of as a necessary step to produce an input which is compatible with D i 's technology. We denote 
, where Q C (n) is the total Cournot quantity, is satisfied for each n ≤ N.
Our contractual assumptions are similar to those in HT and RT. Katz (1991) ). More specifically, U cannot induce the downstream firms to undertake ex post inefficient actions in the output market.
Furthermore, we assume that there is no trade between the downstream firms. This may be the case, for instance, when only the upstream firm has the technology to design the input for the use of each downstream firm or the ability to transport the input.
The surplus generated is divided through bargaining over tariffs between the upstream firm and the downstream firms. The bargaining game between U and D i is as follows: with probability α, U simultaneously makes each D i a take-it-or-leave-it offer of a tariff transfer T U,i (·) Then, each D i either accepts or rejects the offer it was made. With probability 1 − α, all downstream firms simultaneously make take-it-or-leave-it offers T i,U (·)}, i = 1, ..., n to U. Then, U either accepts or rejects each offer. The parameter α can be thought of as the upstream firm's bargaining power.
The timing is the following:
• in stage 1, the upstream firm chooses the number n ≤ N of downstream firms which will be potentially active in further stages. This may be done by specifying technical characteristics which are necessary for compatibility reasons or communicating a particular technology. Without knowing these characteristics or this technology, a downstream firm starts development too late to be able to produce in later stages.
• in stage 2, U bargains with each downstream firm over a tariff
then orders a quantity of input q i and pays T i (q i ) 6 .
• In stage 3, the downstream firms transform the input into an output, observe others' production and choose their prices at which the consumers buy this output.
We assume that an (out-of-equilibrium) offer by U to a downstream firm cannot affect this firm's beliefs about U's offer to another downstream firm. This is natural because the offers are secret and U tries to extract as much rent as it can from each downstream firm. This assumption rules out any manipulation of beliefs and will guarantee the uniqueness of the pure strategy Perfect Bayesian Equilibria we shall derive. This assumption is discussed at 6 Our results would not be affected if firms bargained over the pair {q i , T i }.
length in HT and RT who call it "market-by-market bargaining" or "passive conjectures".
When the quantity q i is exchanged against a transfer T i (q i ), we denote:
the payoff to the upstream firm (its reservation utility is normalized to 0),
As a benchmark, we first turn to the case where the upstream firm's offers are publicly observable. These tariff offers would satisfy 7 :
In this case, the offers can perfectly manipulate the quantities q i keeping the downstream firms' participation constraints binding. Under complete information, U can commit to sell a given amount of input to the industry and appropriate the whole industry surplus, which is maximized under the monopoly quantity 8 . In equilibrium, the total quantity produced is (not surprisingly) the monopoly quantity Q m = arg max P (Q)Q − cQ. Any allocation of the monopoly quantity among downstream firms is an equilibrium. Thus, the industry production and the consumer's surplus do not depend on n, while the payoff to the upstream firm and social welfare decrease with the number 7 Given that transformation costs are low relative to the upstream firm's production cost, it is well-established that the downstream firms will transform all the units of input that they bought and market all the corresponding units of output (see Tirole (1988) , ch. 5).
8 For more on this, see Mathewson and Winter (1984) . If, instead, the downstream firms were to make take-it-or-leave-it offers to the upstream firm and were able to coordinate, they would choose the monopoly quantity ex post. Here, the firms cannot coordinate. Given the simultaneity assumption, whether the offers are secret or not is irrelevant. The case where the downstream firms make the offers is studied in the next section.
The Incentive to Favor Downstream Competition
In this section, we show that the effect of downstream competition on the upstream firm's surplus and social welfare crucially depends on the distribution of bargaining powers. We identify the rent reduction (or output) and negotiation effects. We shall see that when its bargaining power is low enough, the upstream firm may be better off with a competitive downstream industry.
From now on, we assume that the transactions between the upstream firm and a downstream are not observable to other downstream firms. In this setup,
we shall see that the upstream firm is unable to credibly commit to sell the monopoly quantity or not to supply some firms.
The Equilibrium Quantities and Transfers Proposition 1 In equilibrium, the upstream firm supplies each downstream firm the Cournot quantity independently of the distribution of bargaining power.
The expected transfer from each downstream firm to the upstream firm is:
Proof: See Appendix. 2
The total (Cournot) quantity increases with the number of downstream firms, but is independent of bargaining power. The reason is simply that each party making an offer to its trading partner seeks to maximize the surplus from their bilateral relationship regardless the relationships between the upstream firm and the other downstream firms. Whatever the distribution of bargaining power, U cannot commit in any way to restrain the quantity competition between the downstream firms 9 .
When the upstream firm makes the take-it-or-leave-it offers, it appropriates the whole downstream industry Cournot profit. This makes clear that the upstream firm suffers from the inability to commit to supply less than the Cournot quantity. More interestingly, when the downstream firms make the take-it-or-leave-it offers, they cannot prevent the upstream firm from opening another line of production and selling inputs to other downstream firms. This leads them to leave the upstream firm with a rent which increases with the number of firms.
In this simple environment, bargaining power does not affect production.
It simply determines the distribution of the rents obtained for given output between upstream and downstream firms. These two features allow us to focus on the tradeoff between redistribution of rents and size of the rents.
The Rent Reduction Effect
When α = 1, the upstream firm appropriates the industry surplus. If there are more downstream firms than 1 in the downstream market more output is produced than under monopoly and increasing total output through adding downstream firms leads to a rent reduction. We refer to this as the rent reduction effect of competition. When n increases, total output and consumer surplus increase, but the payoff to the upstream firm P (Q(n))Q(n) − 9 Suppose that all downstream firms but D i had agreed that D j , j = i would buy Q m /n. Then, whatever α (the reader can refer to the appendix on this), U and D i would agree on a quantity q i = arg max[P (
+ qP ∈ (−1, 0) since P < 0 and P < 0). This commitment problem is analogous to the Coasian durable good pricing problem in many respects, with the number of firms playing the same role as the number of periods in the durable good monopoly case.
. U appropriates the whole industry surplus which is maximized under monopoly. Therefore, when it has all bargaining power, the upstream firm chooses n = 1 potentially active downstream firms in stage 1, i.e. it forecloses the market, although this is undesirable from a social viewpoint.
The rent reduction effect is actually a natural extension of the (Coasian) commitment problem when focusing on the effect of downstream competition on the payoff to the upstream firm. Here, we start from the observation that when there are less downstream firms, the upstream firm suffers less from its inability to supply them all 10 .
The Negotiation Effect
When α = 0, the bargaining game is reduced to simultaneous contract offers from the downstream firms to the upstream firm. When making an offer, each D i expects that n − 1 other downstream firms will be supplied, and that it will cost cq i + f (n) to the supplier to produce q i units of input. Hence, each D i 's offer and the number of units both increase with n. The key ingredient for the former result is U's increasing cost of opening additional lines of production.
This makes sure that the payoff to the upstream firm,
, increases with n. We call this latter effect the negotiation effect.
The intuition of the negotiation effect can also be understood by assuming fixed total output equally shared between the downstream firms, each of them getting Q/n. Then, increasing n keeping Q constant does not affect the offers made by U. However, each D i has to offer the upstream firm cQ/n+f (n), which is the incremental cost of dealing with the marginal firm. Clearly, the payoff to U, nf (n) − F (n), is increasing in n. As the number of downstream firms grows the upstream firm retains all the inframarginal benefits of supplying them all. This is the negotiation effect. While a downstream monopolist would only have to pay the upstream firm the average cost of producing Q, negotiation with n firms producing Q brings payments of each of them closer to the incremental cost of producing Q/n for each of them. If the upstream firm makes the offer, the output effect of increased competition leads to a reduction in rents and therefore to a reduction in extracted surplus. If the downstream firms make the offers, increased competition makes U benefit from the negotiation effect, increasing the average price of given output.
Hence, in stage 1, the upstream firm publicly picks n = N potentially active downstream firms. Since the upstream firm has no bargaining power, it favors competition (rather than foreclose the market) between the downstream firms to induce them to make higher offers. Thus, the upstream firm's choice of downstream competition crucially depends on its bargaining power.
The negotiation effect leads downstream firms to make offers to U which increase with the degree of competition as measured by the number of downstream firms. While it is modeled through an increasing cost of opening lines of production, such an effect is robust to a number of alternative specifications of the market environment and of the bargaining procedure 11 . This effect is 11 Our cost structure is particularly convenient in that it captures the higher cost of servicing a larger number of firms while leaving the upstream firm with the commitment problem mentioned above. With an increasing marginal cost of production instead of a cost of opening a line of production, downstream firms' offers would be more complicated to describe. Ceteris paribus, the competition effect would be more radical than in our paper. If we leave the structure of our model unchanged apart from this different cost structure, downstream firms might be tempted to buy the total industry quantity and to produce the monopoly quantity. The increasing marginal cost of production would, in some circumstances, allow the upstream firm to commit not to supply more units of input when this becomes too costly. The intuitive outcome that each firm offers the supplier's incremental cost of production (which increases with other firms' production because the marginal cost increases) would require different specifications of the game, such as capacity constraints or infinitely repeated contract offers. absent in BW because they assumed no cost for the upstream firm. In HT, the offers are always made by the upstream firms and this effect is ignored.
The choice between foreclosure and downstream competition
Analyzing two polar cases (α = 0 and α = 1) enabled us to identify two antagonistic effects of competition. Now, we address the trade-off between these effects. More competition between downstream firms improves the upstream firm's negotiation position, but decreases the industry profit. For α ∈ [0, 1], the payoff to the upstream firm can be written
The following proposition follows from the previous discussion. This motive, however, is unrelated to social concerns. From a social viewpoint, since the positive effect of increasing n on consumer surplus decreases with n and the cost of opening additional lines increases with n, the welfareimproving effect of an increase in competition clearly decreases in n. More importantly from a policy viewpoint, we should wonder whether U's incentive to promote competition is too low from a social viewpoint. This can be done easily by comparing (3) and SW . When U makes the offers, given that π i = 0 whatever n and that U bears the cost of opening additional lines of production, the only difference with the objective of a social planner is that U does not internalize the positive effect of more competition on CS. Hence, U has too low an incentive to favor competition from a social viewpoint. When D i make the offers, it ignores both the positive effect of an increase in competition (and production) to consumers and the negative effect to downstream firms. The additional fixed cost of servicing one more firm is borne by the downstream firms, and it benefits U even though the associated cost of opening an additional line of production is higher than the positive effect on consumers of increasing production to Q(n + 1).
Proposition 2 The effect of downstream competition on the payoff to the up

Corollary 1 The upstream firm's incentive to favor competition is lower than that of a social planner when α > α 2 and can be either lower or higher when
This result is to be contrasted with the analysis of market foreclosure in BW and HT. In these papers, the upstream firm's incentive to promote competition in vertically related markets is too low from a social viewpoint. Here, this need not be the case, which, of course, has potential strong implications from a competition policy viewpoint.
A hotly debated issue in antitrust policy concerns the response to vertical integration. Vertical integration is widely thought of as a somewhat radical way of imposing vertical restraints on vertically related firms. In this section, as in HT and RT, we view vertical integration as an opportunity for the upstream firm to overcome the (Coasian) commitment problem described in section 3 by restricting production 12 . We focus on the effect of downstream competition on the incentive for the upstream firm to vertically integrate one downstream firm.
We assume that the owner of a production unit's assets is entitled to all returns generated by this unit (although profit sharing would be enough) and all decision rights concerning production and trade involving this unit. Ownership will matter because of contract incompleteness. We followed the literature in assuming that no contract can be signed before the bargaining stage. Like Grossman and Hart (1986) , BW and HT where this assumption is discussed at length, the characteristics of the input may be difficult to write in a contract in advance. It will become clear shortly that we can abstract from modeling the acquisition cost as Bertrand competition between downstream firms to sell their assets would lead to a zero cost of acquiring a downstream firm.
For simplicity, we assume that U merges with either 0 or 1 downstream firm. This may be either because a vertical structure with more than one downstream firm has to bear a prohibitively high agency cost or, as we shall see now, because monopolization and total foreclosure in equilibrium make only the integration of one firm profitable. Indeed, we first consider how vertical integration affects bargaining and production.
Lemma 1 Under vertical integration, the upstream firm supplies its subsidiary
only. It supplies the monopoly quantity Q m .
Proof: See Appendix. 2
Since it can observe both its transactions with the other downstream firms and it obtains all the returns of the vertical structure (having a share β would not affect the result), the upstream firm internalizes the negative externality of supplying other downstream firms on its subsidiary. Given this informational advantage, nothing prevents its from supplying the monopoly quantity. The upstream firm can appropriate the whole industry surplus by supplying only the firm it owns. This surplus is maximized under the monopoly quantity. If it supplies another downstream firm, it will supply more than the monopoly quantity in equilibrium. Thus, the only equilibrium is that U supplies the monopoly quantity to its downstream firm and does not supply any other firm.
There is monopolization and total foreclosure (here, the absence of an outside option for downstream firms is crucial). The payoff to the integrated structure does not depend on the number of firms in the market.
We now study the effect of downstream competition on the upstream firm's incentive to vertically integrate one downstream firm. If α = 0, U vi − U ni decreases with n since U ni increases with n. When many firms are in the downstream market, the upstream firm's surplus is already quite high under non-integration and the profit increase under vertical integration is not so high.
In contrast, when there are few downstream firms, the payoff under non integration may be so low that vertical integration is worthwhile. Conversely, if In this model, vertical integration is always desirable to the upstream firm since it solves its commitment problem. However, vertical integration often comes with costs in practice. Following BW and HT, we could have assumed that a vertically integrated structure must bear some agency cost A that a non integrated structure does not have to bear. Then, vertical integration would take place when the downstream industry is competitive (resp. concentrated) enough if the upstream firm's bargaining power is high (resp. low). 
The Effect of Upstream Competition
Assume now that there are two upstream firms U p , p ∈ {1, 2}, both of them with a marginal cost of production c and a cost of opening lines of production f (·). With probability α (resp. 1 − α), both upstream (resp. downstream) firms make take-it-or-leave-it offers. Then, we can show that our competition effect pertains while the rent reduction effect vanishes and is replaced with a dual competition effect which allows upstream firms to increase their payoff when the number of downstream firms increases. 14 Slightly modified setups would have led us to the result that some socially desirable vertical integrations may not take place when α is high as well. For instance, when U invests in design (the inverse demand curve P (e, Q) satisfying P e > 0, P e,Q > 0), the consumer appropriates part of the surplus created by the upstream firm's investment, and the incentive to vertically integrate can be too low relative to the social optimum. When α is high, monopolization after vertical integration may increase investment. Consumer surplus may be either higher or lower since consumers get a smaller share of a larger pie. Since U ignores the positive effect of higher investment on consumer surplus, the incentive for monopolization/vertical integration may be either too high or too low from a social viewpoint.
Proposition 4 The transfer functions, which are of the form
number of dowsntream firms, the more downstream firms they supply and the higher the profit they make when supplying an inframarginal downstream firm.
Note that this result also implies that all the results we had in section 3 with α = 0 now hold for any α. In particular, the incentive to encourage competition in the downstream market may be higher than that of a social planner.
The strategies of vertically integrated firms are more difficult to capture.
First assume that one upstream firm, say U 1 , owns one downstream firm and the other one, say U 2 does not. Given this "partially integrated" market structure, We believe that this paper would allow for a number of potential extensions.
First, while we assumed that vertical integration is irreversible, vertical mergers and spin-offs may take place sequentially. This paper suggests that a shift in the demand curve or a change in the competitive environment may trigger such mergers or spin-offs. This could be a starting point towards an analysis of the dynamics of integration. Second, most assumptions of our paper seem reasonable to analyze financial intermediation. The secrecy of transactions is an important factor of many financial contracts. Interbank loans suggest that banks' cost of capital is often a linear function of this capital, while fixed fees may be here to pay for labour and operating costs. Our results suggest that an investor with a significant market power and high bargaining power would tend to offer more equity-like contracts while the same investor with low bargaining power or competing investors would tend to offer credit or debt contracts with fixed fees. Interestingly, fixed fees, as opposed to the linear part of the two-part tariffs (e.g. interest rates), would be an important determinant of upstream firms' profits and they should be looked at carefully when examining the effective level of competition.
Proof of Proposition 1.
We first set α = 1. The upstream firm makes simultaneous take-it-or-leave-it offers to all downstream firms which satisfy
Clearly, each downstream firm's participation constraint (??) is binding.
Anticipating the choice of q i , the upstream firm offers a tariff T U,i (·) which is limited by the secrecy of its transactions with the other downstream firms.
Therefore, the quantity chosen by each downstream firm is
where R C stands for the reaction function of a standard Cournot game. Hence, this quantity turns out to be the Cournot quantity. Then, U appropriates the full industry surplus and gets a total transfer T (Q C ) = P (Q C )Q C .
We now investigate the case α = 0. Each downstream firm makes a takeit-or-leave-it offer (to the upstream firm) which satisfies
s.t. q i ∈ arg max P (q
where l (resp m) holds for the number of other downstream firms supplied by the upstream firm if D i 's offer is accepted (resp. rejected). The latter constraint, which is binding, can be rewritten T i,U (q i ) = cq i + A i (n), where A i (n) is independent of q i 16 . Hence, without loss of generality, we can restrict ourselves to transfer functions which are two-part tariffs. This implies that, here again, each downstream firm will buy and transform a quantity satisfying
which leads, once again, to the Cournot quantity q C . Rewriting (??) leads to T (q i ) = cq i + f (n), which gives the result. 2
Proof of Proposition 2.
∀n ∈ {1, N − 1}, π U (n + 1) − π U (n) = αG(n) + (1 − α)H(n), where
H(n).
This implies that
The left hand side is strictly positive for any In our setup, all units bought by downstream firms will be used. This is why we did not have to formally distinguish between the number of units bought and the number of units sold by downstream firms.
Proof of Lemma 1.
The upstream firm supplies its downstream firm, say D 1 , the quantity q 1 = R C (q −1 ). Therefore, the quantity decisions after U and D i (i = 1) made the offers both satisfy q i = arg max
which is maximized for q i = 0 (note that this result does not depend on the cost of operating lines of production). 2
Proof of Proposition 4.
If the downstream firms expect upstream firm U p to have supplied n p − 1 other downstream firms, an analysis similar to that of the proof of Proposition 1
indicates that (1) their offer will be f (n p ) + cq i , (2) each downstream firm will produce the Cournot quantity, and (3) half of the downstream firms is supplied by each upstream firm if n is even, and that (n−1)/2 downstream firms will be supplied by each upstream firm while the n th firm will randomize if n is odd.
Consider now the offers made by the upstream firms. Note that, here again, the upstream firms make profits when they supply
